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I wanted to thank all of you who contributed to Mitt Romney.  You can’t realize how much 
leverage this gives Huron going forward to ask various people for business. 
 
This is not about me trying to force a political candidate on you, … This is just business and 
the way business works. 
 
Gary E. Holdren, CEO, Huron Consulting Group, Inc. 
(email correspondence as reported in the Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2008, p. A4) 
   
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In a world of mobile capital, what factors determine business tax rates?  The standard 
model of strategic tax competition assumes that government policymakers are perfectly 
benevolent, acting solely to maximize the utility of the representative resident in their 
jurisdiction.  In this framework, business tax rates prevailing in a jurisdiction are heavily 
influenced by the tax policies pursued by its competitors.  In addition to these strategic factors, 
tax rates may be influenced by the economic conditions and voters preferences within a state, as 
well as aggregate factors such as the business cycle and inflation.   
However, as the quotation at the beginning of this paper reminds, business campaign 
contributions are likely to be an additional influential factor on policymakers.  This paper 
explores the connections between business contributions and business tax rates at the state level.  
While few executives are as explicit as Mr. Holdren about the impact of campaign contributions, 
there is a pervasive belief that they have a marked impact on policy decisions.  We extend the 
standard tax competition paradigm by considering the role of business campaign contributions.  
Given the electoral and economic environments in which they operate, state policymakers are 
partly influenced by the rent-seeking behavior of businesses.  In turn, businesses recognize the 
factors affecting policymaker’s welfare and make campaign contributions to influence tax policy.  
These changes to the standard strategic tax competition model imply that business campaign 
contributions may affect not only the levels of equilibrium tax rates, but also the slope of the tax 
reaction function between jurisdictions.  Thus, business campaign contributions may affect tax 
competition and enhance or retard the mobility of capital across jurisdictions.   
 These predictions are examined by combining U.S. state panel data on capital tax policy 
and other relevant state-level economic and political variables with newly-compiled state-level 
data on contributions to candidates for state office.  The latter data are constructed from 
contribution-level records compiled by the National Institute for Money in State Politics 
(NIMSP).  These records are required by law to be publicly disclosed and hence cover nearly all 
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 candidates for state office.  From these records, we construct at the state level the total amounts 
of contributions by type of giver (business vs. non-business), type of office (e.g., house, 
governor), and type of candidate (e.g., winning, incumbent).  These contributions are sizeable.  
During the 2003 to 2006 period, $1.5 billion, or nearly $5 per capita, was contributed by the 
business sector (as defined in Section 4) to candidates for state offices.  Of this $1.5 Billion, 
approximately 33% went to gubernatorial candidates (including lieutenant governor candidates), 
another 33% to state senate candidates, 21% to state house candidates, and the remaining 12% to 
candidates for other state offices (e.g., attorney general, state judges).   
 Our study of business campaign contributions begins by discussing a theoretical 
framework in which policymakers’ welfare depends on the utility of the representative resident 
and the level of business campaign contributions.   The theoretical framework is a two-step game 
in which firms first offer a contribution schedule linking tax rates and business campaign 
contributions.  In the second step, policymakers’ face this contribution schedule constraint and 
choose the combination of business campaign contributions and tax rates that maximizes their 
welfare.   The next section introduces the econometric equation.  Our empirical results are based 
on the reaction function standard in the tax competition literature – tax policy in a given state is 
related to tax policies in the competitive set of states and various control variables.  We also 
include our business campaign contributions variable.   
 Our state-level dataset is introduced in the next section.  The dataset contains four 
business tax variables – the corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit rate, the capital 
apportionment weight, and the average corporate tax rate – and additional political variables that 
determine business taxes and that serve as instruments.  Our unique data on state-level campaign 
contributions are also discussed. 
 We then turn to our empirical results.  We find that the reaction function is negatively 
sloped; that is, after accounting for state and time effects and economic and political variables at 
the state level, tax policy in a given state moves inversely with the corporate income tax rate, the 
capital apportionment weight, and the average corporate tax rate.  To assess the role of business 
campaign contributions, we augment the reaction function with business contributions to 
candidates for the state house (assembly).  We find little evidence that business contributions 
affect the slope of the reaction function.  However, we document a significant effect of business 
campaign contributions on the level of tax policy.  
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  Lastly, we interpret these results in terms of the economic value of campaign 
contributions.  How much are corporate taxes reduced per $1 of business contributions?  We find 
that the economic value of a $1 business campaign contribution is nearly $4 in terms of lower 
state corporate taxes.  These results call for further research aimed at understanding the 
determinants of business campaign contributions and the persistence of such large gaps between 
benefits and costs. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK    
 This section discusses the links between the corporate income tax rate (CIT) and business 
campaign contributions (BCC) in a world with mobile capital.  (Our discussion focuses on the 
corporate income tax rate, though the model applies to any tax variable affecting capital income.)  
The theoretical framework presented here is a two-step game (somewhat similar to Grossman 
and Helpman, 1994).  We begin by discussing the contribution schedule offered by firms that 
links CIT and BCC.  Faced with this constraint, policymakers’ choose the BCC/CIT combination 
that maximizes their welfare.    
 In the first-step of the game, firm profits depend on sales less four costs – the profit tax 
assessed at rate CIT, the fixed opportunity cost of capital, the cost of labor, and the cost of 
business contributions.  The maximum level of profits is determined conditional on BCC and 
CIT.  For this optimal level of profits, we construct an iso-profit relation linking CIT and BCC.  
An increase in BCC lowers profits, but this negative effect is counterbalanced by reduced tax 
payments to hold profits constant.  This negative relation between BCC and CIT is the 
contribution schedule that constrains policymakers. 
 In the second-step, policymakers’ maximize welfare, which depends on two arguments.  
The first argument is the utility of the representative resident, reflecting benevolence for 
residents or a concern for reelection.  Resident utility is a function of private and public goods.  
These assumptions are standard in the tax competition literature.  We extend that literature by 
assuming that policymakers’ welfare also depends on BCC.  The level of BCC impacts 
policymakers by expanding their personal consumption and/or increasing their probability of 
reelection.  This formulation of policymakers’ welfare follows Grossman and Helpman (1994, 
equation (5)) and Edwards and Keen (1996, Section 2).  In the latter model, policymakers’ 
welfare depends on resident utility and “some item of public expenditure…which, while 
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 financed from general revenues, benefits only the policymaker…” (p. 118).   
 It is useful to consider the residents’ utility in isolation.  Residents face four constraints in 
maximizing their utility.  First, output is determined by a production function that, crucially, 
depends on the amount of capital located in the state.  Second, this output is allocated to private 
goods, public goods, and factor payments on imported capital.  Third, government spending on 
public goods is financed by personal taxes (assumed fixed) and corporate taxes.  The latter is 
assessed as a source-based tax on profits.  Fourth, due to capital mobility, the amount of capital 
available in a state is negatively related to CIT and positively related to the corporate income tax 
rate prevailing in competitive states (CIT#).  Mobility can be modeled by imposing a national 
rate of return constraint equating the net-of-tax marginal product of capital across states.  
Alternatively, to represent frictions in the national allocation of capital, we can posit a general 
function in which CIT has a negative, and CIT# a positive, impact on the amount of capital 
located in a given state.  Combining the above relations, we find that, conditioned on economic 
and demographic variables and CIT#, resident utility depends on CIT.    
 In order to obtain some intuition for the underlying economic forces, assume that public 
goods are underprovided.  In this case, an increase in CIT increases utility by financing an 
increase in public goods.  This increase is tempered by the reduction of output that occurs as 
capital flows to neighboring states because of the higher CIT.  The reaction of neighboring 
states, in terms of changing CIT#, depends on how the “windfall” from the capital flowing into 
their states is allocated to private and public goods.   When the residents’ utility maximization 
problem is considered in isolation, there exists a provisionally optimal CIT that depends on CIT# 
and other factors.   
 Policymakers’ welfare depends positively on residents’ utility (determined by CIT), as 
well as BCC.  Conditional on holding welfare constant, an increase in BCC will lead to a 
decrease in CIT.   The latter deviation from the optimal CIT results in lower utility for residents, 
and hence lower welfare for policymakers, but this latter effect is offset by the increase in 
policymakers’ welfare from BCC.  As in traditional microeconomic analyses, there is a family of 
indifference curves that are indexed by policymakers’ welfare and that relate CIT and BCC.  
These indifference curves capture the fundamental tradeoff facing policymakers – the benefit of 
an increase in BCC is offset by lower CIT, lower public spending, and lower levels of resident 
utility.  Constrained by firms’ contribution schedule, policymakers choose the BCC/CIT 
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 combination that yields the highest possible welfare.  
 In sum, this two-stage game implies the existence of optimal levels of CIT and BCC as 
functions of CIT#, exogenous variables, and “deep” parameters (such as the parameters 
characterizing the forms of the welfare, utility, and production functions and the degree of capital 
mobility).  However, these relations do not allow us to assess directly the questions of interest in 
this paper – the impacts of BCC on the level of CIT and the slope of the reaction function.  We 
estimate instead the structural relation (tradeoff) between CIT and BCC that follows from the 
policymakers’ welfare function.  This relation is conditioned on CIT#, and instrumental variables 
are used to identify the exogenous variation in BCC and CIT#. 
 
 
THE ESTIMATING EQUATION 
 The above considerations suggest the following estimating equation for state i at time t, 
 
[1]   #i,t i,t i,t i,tx u ,τ = ατ + β +    
 
where i,tτ  is a tax variable – either the corporate income tax rate, the investment tax credit rate,  
the capital apportionment weight, or the average corporate tax rate; #i,tτ  is the tax variable for the 
competitive states (the definition of competitive states is discussed in the next section); i,tx  is a 
set of control variables; i,tu  is an error term, and α  and β  are parameters to be estimated.   
 Equation [1] is the standard estimating equation for investigating tax competition, and we 
expand on it in five ways.1  First, the error term is assumed to have a two-way error components 
structure and equals the sum of a state time-invariant effect ( iζ ), a time fixed effect ( tλ ), and a 
random error ( i,tε ).  With regard to the state effects, we present results for both Random Effects 
(RE) and Fixed Effects (FE) specifications.  Neither estimator dominates.  If the state effects are 
correlated with the regressors, only FE delivers consistent estimates of the  'sα  and 'sβ .  
                                                 
1 Brueckner (2003), Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993), and Devereux, Lockwood, and 
Redoano (2008) use a similar estimating equation.   
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 However, with a panel short in the time dimension, as we have in this paper, the FE estimates 
can be estimated imprecisely.2  The RE model, on the other hand, relies on a combination of 
cross-section and time-series variation and generates more precise estimates.  However, the 
consistency of RE estimates requires that the state effects are uncorrelated with the regressors.  
Second, we include three variables to control for economic conditions and political preferences:  
the investment to capital ratio ( i,t 1IK − , which is lagged to avoid issues associated with 
simultaneity), the political preferences of state residents ( i,tVOTERPREFERENCES ), and the 
investment to capital ratio for the neighboring states (
i,t 1
#IK − ).  These variables are described in 
more detail in the next section.  Third, the tax competition variable enters with contemporaneous 
and two lag values.3  Including lagged values allows for the possibility that capital mobility may 
be a gradual process taking more than one year.  Fourth, to assess the role of business 
contributions on this tax competition model, we include i,tBCC  and i,t 1BCC −  as additional 
regressors.  The lagged value of BCC is included to recognize that campaign contributions for a 
given election may be spread out over the two years leading up to the election.  Fifth, since the 
contemporaneous values of #i,tτ  and i,tBCC  are likely to be endogenous,we estimate the model 
by IV/GMM, though we also report results where one or both of these variables is assumed 
exogenous.4  The excluded instruments for #i,tτ  in the IV/GMM regressions are variables 
                                                 
2 The limited variation in the time dimension is traceable to two aspects of our panel data.  First, the four tax 
variables we examine have limited time variation in most states.  This is particularly true for the capital 
apportionment weight, for which changes tend to be of a “one-and-done” nature (i.e., changes occur at most once or 
twice in the sample for most states).  Second, our panel is unbalanced because only a few states have business 
campaign contributions data before the late 1990s (see the table “Number of States with Reported Business 
Contributions in NIMSP Data” in the Appendix). 
 
3 Data limitations precluded adding additional time lags.  Allowing for a greater lag length with a lagged dependent 
variable generated unreliable estimates. 
  
4 We search for appropriate instruments in four steps.  First, the instrument set consists of included and excluded 
instruments; the included instruments are the exogenous variables appearing in the estimating equation (i.e., the 
i,tx 's ).  Second, potential excluded instruments are constructed from those listed in the next section.  Third, we 
examine all possible combinations of the excluded instruments for #i,tτ  and i,tBCC separately, store the J and 
eigenvalue statistics, and identify the subset of instruments (excluded and included) valid at the 10% level based on 
J tests.  Fourth, from this subset of valid instruments, we choose the instrument set that is most relevant, as assessed 
by the eigenvalue statistic.   The fourth step of our procedure for selecting an optimal instrument set among a large 
set of potential instruments is similar to that proposed in Donald and Newey (2001), although they suggest an 
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 capturing the political preferences of voters in the competitive states.  The instruments used in 
estimation vary by the tax variable serving as the dependent variable and are described in the 
following section.    
Based on these considerations, the following equation is the basis for the estimates 
reported in this paper,    
 
[2]   
2
#
i,t i t k i,t k
k 0
−
=
τ = ζ + λ + α τ∑  
IK VP IK # #
i,t 1 i,t i,t 1
0 i,t 1 i,t 1
i,t
2 1
k k
k 0 k 0
IK VOTERPREFERENCES IK
BCC BCC
, .
− −
−
= =
+ β + β + β
+ γ + γ
+ ε
α ≡ α γ ≡ γ∑ ∑
 
  
 
THE PANEL DATASET   
 This section briefly describes the construction of the data used in this study.  The series 
are for the 48 contiguous U.S. states, cover years from 1988 to 2006 (depending on the state), 
and can be set into three categories discussed in the following sub-sections.5   
 
Tax and Economic Variables 
 We primarily focus on three state tax policies in this study, and they are referred to in 
general as i,tτ  --  the corporate income tax rate ( i,tCIT ), the investment tax credit rate ( i,tITC ), 
and the weight on capital (or property) in the state’s income apportionment formula ( i,tCAW ).  
The state corporate income tax rate is the effective marginal tax rate for the highest bracket of 
corporate income.  The effective marginal rate is generally lower than the legislated (or 
statutory) rate due to the deductibility against federal taxable income of taxes paid to the state.  
                                                                                                                                                             
alternative relevance statistic in place of the eigenvalue statistic.   
 
5 Alaska and Hawaii are excluded because of the great geographic distance to a neighboring state, thus straining the 
notion of a “competitive” state as defined by distance between population centroids.  
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 Some states allow full deductibility of federal corporate income taxes from state taxable income; 
Iowa and Missouri allow only 50% deductibility; and some states allow no deductibility at all.  It 
has not generally been recognized that, owing to deductibility of taxes paid to another level of 
government, the effective corporate income tax rates at the state and federal levels are 
functionally related to each other.  These interrelationships generate two equations in two 
unknowns, and their solution yields the effective state corporate income tax rate.   
The state investment tax credit is a credit against state corporate income tax liabilities.  In 
most states, the effective amount of the investment tax credit is simply the legislated investment 
tax credit rate multiplied by the value of capital expenditures put into place within the state in a 
tax year.  The effective rate is lower than the legislated rate in a handful of states for two reasons.  
First, five states (Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, North Carolina, and Ohio) permit the state 
investment tax credit to be applied only to equipment.  For these states, the legislated ITC rate is 
multiplied by 2/3, which is approximately the average ratio of equipment capital to total capital 
in our data.  Second, in some states, the legislated investment tax credit rate varies by the level of 
capital expenditures; we use the legislated credit rate for the highest tier of capital expenditures. 
 The capital apportionment weight is the weight that the state assigns to capital in its 
formula for apportioning income among the multiple states in which a firm generates federal 
taxable income.  Every U.S. state that taxes corporate income uses “formulary apportionment” to 
instruct firms that operate in multiple states on allocating their federal taxable income to that 
state.  The apportionment formula is in all cases a weighted average of the company’s sales, 
payroll, and property, though the weight on one or more factor can be and often is equal to zero. 
The weights in this formula vary considerably by state.  Over the last 30 years, states have 
moved toward increasing the weight on sales and decreasing the weights on payroll and property.  
These changes encourage job creation and investment in-state and “export” the tax burden to out-
of-state business owners that sell goods and services in-state but employ workers and capital out-
of-state (Wilson, 2006).  The capital apportionment weight can be thought of as a capital tax 
instrument with somewhat similar effects as the corporate income tax rate.   
Data on CAW are obtained from the following sources.  First, data by state for 1997 was 
obtained from Edmiston (1998), who compiled the data from the Federation of Tax 
Administrators (1997) and generously provided us with an update of these data for 2001.  
Second, we use information from Omer and Shelley (2004) documenting when each state first 
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 diverged from the traditional apportionment weights of (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) on payroll, property, and 
sales.  This information generates a provisional series (assuming no changes between the first 
change and 1997 and/or between 1997 and 2001) that we then refine by checking with individual 
state tax departments.   
The three tax policy measures discussed above have the advantage that they are directly 
chosen by state policymakers and hence conform well with our model of strategic tax 
competition and business rent-seeking.  However, they do not provide a comprehensive measure 
of the total tax assessed on capital.  A more comprehensive measure would include other taxes 
and fees and would account for the ability of business to avoid or mitigate the corporate income 
tax via various tax planning strategies.  Thus, we have also constructed a measure of the 
“average tax rate” ( i,tATR ) as the ratio of state tax revenues from corporate taxes, severance 
taxes, and license fees to total state business income, as measured by gross operating surplus.   
The competitive states tax policy ( #i,tτ ) is an important variable in our analysis and, for 
state i, is defined as a weighted-average of the tax policies prevailing in the other 47 contiguous 
states.  This weighted-average formulation can be interpreted as a spatial lag on i,tτ .  The 
weights reflect the "competitive closeness" of the other states as measured by the inverse 
distance between the population centroids for a given state and that of each of the other 47 
contiguous states.  The weights are normalized to sum to unity.    
In the estimating equation, we control for differing economic conditions among states by 
including the investment to capital ratio, i,tIK , defined as real investment expenditures in 
equipment (excluding software) and structures divided by the constant-dollar replacement value 
of the capital stock for the manufacturing sector (NAICS sectors 31 to 33).  The capital stock 
series is computed according to a perpetual inventory based on real investment expenditures, a 
depreciation rate, and an adjustment to the initial value for book value and inflation.   
Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this sub-
section can be found in the Data Appendix to Chirinko and Wilson (2008).   
 
Political Variables  
 The political preferences of state residents ( i,tVOTERPREFERENCES ) is also a control 
variable in the estimating equation and is defined by the extent to which Republicans control the 
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 state government:  0.0 if they control neither the legislature nor governorship, 0.5 if they control 
only the legislature or only the governorship, and 1.0 if the they control both the legislature and 
governorship.   
 The candidate instrumental variables for #i,tτ  in the GMM estimation are drawn from the 
following list of nine voter preference variables for competitive states.  Voter preferences in 
competitive states should be relevant instruments – because they affect tax policy in competitive 
states for the same reasons that voter preferences in state i affect tax policy in state i – and valid 
instruments – because they are unrelated to tax policy in state i (conditional on state and time 
effects):   
 
(a)   the governor is Republican (R).  (The complementary class of politicians is  
Democrat (D) or Independent (I).  An informal examination of the political landscape 
suggests that Independents tend to be more closely aligned with the Democratic Party.  
We thus treat D or I politicians as belonging to the same class, DI); 
 
 (b) the majority of both houses of the legislature are R; 
 
 (c)   the majority of both houses of the legislature are DI;  
 
 (d)   the governorship changed last year from R to DI; 
 
 (e)   the majority control of the legislature changed last year from D or split (between   
  houses) to R; 
 
 (f)   an interaction between the R governor and the R legislature indicator variables; 
 
 (g)  an interaction between R governor and the DI legislature indicator variables (note that  
                   the omitted interaction category is R governor and a split legislature dummy);  
 
(h) the reelection of an incumbent governor last year; 
 
(i) the reelection of a Republican incumbent governor last year. 
 
We form first-order and second-order spatial lags (i.e., weighted averages with the same 
distance-weights used in constructing #i,tτ ) of the above variables as potential instruments.  Each 
of the four tax variables is projected against different subsets drawn from this set of potential 
instruments.  The subset used in estimation for each tax variable is the same instrument sets 
selected in Chirinko and Wilson (2009) based on an optimal instrument search algorithm 
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 described in footnote 6..  The instrument sets are listed in the Notes To Table 2 and 3.   
Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this sub-
section can be found in the Data Appendix to Chirinko and Wilson (2008).   
 
Business Campaign Contributions Variables 
The business campaign contributions data (BCC)  are a unique part of this paper.  These 
data are for contributions made by individuals and organizations to candidates for state office 
constructed from contribution-level records compiled by the National Institute for Money in 
State Politics (NIMSP).  The NIMSP assigns each campaign contribution an economic interest 
code that places it in a sector.  These sectors more or less follow industry classifications but also 
include labor organizations, “ideologies,” political parties, etc.  We define the “business” 
supersector as the sum of the following 9 sectors:  agriculture; construction; communications and 
electronics; defense; energy and natural resources; finance, insurance, and real estate; general 
business; transportation; and health.  For example, a contribution by a consulting firm or an 
individual working at a consulting firm would be credited to the general business sector and 
counted as a business contribution.  A contribution by a university professor would be credited to 
the education sector and would not be counted as a business contribution.  The NIMSP data are 
an unbalanced panel.  A few states have data beginning in the late 1980s but, for most states, 
data on contributions are not available until the late 1990s.  Several i,tBCC  variables are 
available for this study:  contributions to candidates for the house (H), senate (S), governorship 
(G), and all three offices combined (HSG).  The estimates in this paper are based on business 
contributions made to candidates for the state house because of our a priori belief that revenue 
bills will tend to be initiated in this legislative chamber and because house elections occur at a 
greater frequency (every two years) and with more regularity than senate or gubernatorial 
elections.6  The Hi,tBCC  variable is defined as the logarithm of business campaign contributions 
made to candidates for the state house per capita.  
                                                 
6 The proportion of seats up for elections generally is constant over time for state houses but varies for state senates, 
which hampers the comparability of a state’s senate contributions data across different years.  It should also be noted 
that the relative infrequency of gubernatorial elections is reflected in the lumpiness of the data on campaign 
contributions for gubernatorial candidates, typically positive only every fourth year.  Such lumpiness, particularly in 
a panel with a short time dimension, greatly limits our ability to estimate the effect of gubernatorial contributions on 
tax policy. 
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 The candidate instrumental variables for i,tBCC  in the GMM estimation are drawn from 
the following list of six variables based on campaign contributions and the number of candidates: 
 
(a) the level of campaign contribution limits for corporations to house candidates in that  
 state; 
 
(b) the number of candidates that ran for a state house seat; 
 
(c) the amount of non-business campaign contributions to winning candidates; 
 
(d)  the amount of non-business contributions to losing candidates; 
 
(e) the ratio of (c) to (d), as a measure of the funding competitiveness of races within the          
 state; 
 
(f) the amount of business contributions to candidates for other, non-tax-policy-setting 
 state offices (i.e., offices other than governor, state house, or state senate). 
 
The optimal instrument set for i,tBCC  is chosen in the same manner as for 
#
i,tτ  described in 
footnote 6.  This set for i,tBCC is the same in all four models (which differ by the tax variable 
serving as the dependent variable) and consists of the single variable, the number of candidates 
that ran for a state house seat in state i and year t (item (b)).   
Details concerning the construction and data sources for the series discussed in this sub-
section can be found in the Appendix.  
 Summary statistics for the business campaign contributions, tax, and control variables are 
presented in Table 1.  Note that the “H”, “S”, “G”, and “HSG” superscripts on BCC in the table 
refer to “House,” “Senate,” “Governor,” and “House, Senate, and Governor combined,” 
respectively.  There are at least three notable characteristics.  First, all of the business 
contributions series exhibit a good deal of variation, as standard deviations exceed their means, 
yet have zero values for more than 50% of observations (see the quartiles in columns 3 to 5).  
Specifically, the proportion of observations with zero values is 53%, 55%, and 63% for BCC to 
House, Senate, and Governor, respectively.  This predominance of zeros is driven in part by the 
large number of state-years, mostly off-election years in the state, in which there are no business 
contributions.  Second, among the tax variables, i,tITC has the most variation (relative to its 
mean).  Third, the averaging underlying the definition of the competitive states tax policy and 
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 investment/capital ratio variables (indicated by a superscript #) has a substantial effect in 
reducing the variation in these variables relative to their in-state counterparts.   
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS   
Tax Competition – Baseline Results 
OLS and GMM estimates of the standard tax competition model, defined in equation [2] 
with the effect of BBC removed by constraining the 'sγ  to equal zero, are presented in Table 2 
for i,tCIT , i,tITC , and i,tCAW .  The regressions underlying Table 2 are based on a Random 
Effects (RE) model.  The p-values, based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, are shown 
in braces below each coefficient estimate.  We begin with the OLS estimates in columns 1 to 3 of 
Table 2.  The sum of the coefficients on the competitive states tax policy, α , is negative for all 
three tax variables, though it is statistically significant only for the capital apportionment weight; 
that is, the reaction function, #i,t i,td / dτ τ , is negatively sloped.  However, tax competition among 
states necessarily implies that there will be a correlation between the error term and #i,tτ  leading 
to potentially inconsistent estimates.  The OLS estimates assume that #i,tτ  is exogenous and, 
hence, the results in columns 1 to 3 must be viewed cautiously.  An instrumental variables 
estimator is required.   
 Comparable GMM estimates with the RE model are presented in columns 4 to 6.  The 
instruments vary by tax variable and are listed in the Notes To Tables 2 and 3.  Relative to the 
OLS estimates, the GMM estimates of the 'sα are lower (in absolute value) for each tax variable.  
Each remains negative, though none of the three are statistically significant. 
 The results of estimating the same specifications using a Fixed Effects (FE) model are 
shown in Table 3.  The reaction function slope for all three tax policies remains negative.  
However, in the FE model, the GMM estimated slope for CIT is now statistically significant at 
the 10% level and that for CAW has a p-value only slightly above 10%.   The α  for ITC  is very 
close to zero.   This pattern of results may be partly explained by the quality of the instruments.  
For CIT  and CAW , the instruments are both valid and relevant, as indicated by the J Statistic p-
value (testing overidentifying restrictions) and the minimum eigenvalue statistic (testing the 
correlation between #i,tτ  and the instruments), respectively.  The low value of the latter statistic 
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 suggests that the instruments for ITC are weak. 
In sum, the results from Tables 2 and 3 suggest that the slopes of the reaction function for 
CIT and CAW are negative and confirm the importance of tax competition in determining these 
capital tax policies.  Though a negatively-sloping reaction function may seem counter-intuitive, 
it is not inconsistent with the theory of strategic tax competition and has been found previously 
in other empirical work (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001; Chirinko and Wilson, 2009).  The 
intuition for a negative slope from a model of strategic tax competition is as follows.  Suppose 
the out-of-state tax rate rises.  This increase will cause mobile capital to flow into the state in 
question, raising the state’s tax base.  If the income elasticity of residents’ demand for public 
goods (relative to private goods) is negative, residents may prefer to use this “windfall” to 
finance a tax cut, which would represent a negative-sloping reaction function.  In this case, 
residents view existing public services as adequate and recognize that, with their now-larger tax 
base, they can maintain the existing level of public services at a lower tax rate and shift 
consumption toward more private goods. 
 
The Role of Business Campaign Contributions  
 The unique contribution of this study is to quantify the role of business campaign 
contributions on business tax policy.  This impact is investigated by estimating equation [2] via 
GMM and assessing the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the estimated 'sγ  .  The 
results based on the RE and FE models are shown in Tables 4 and 5, respectively.  The #i,tτ  
variable is treated as endogenous in all models, using the same instruments for #i,tτ as used in the 
regressions underlying columns 4-6 of Tables 2 and 3.  The i,tBCC  variable is treated as an 
exogenous variable in columns 1 to 3 and as an endogenous variable in columns 4 to 6.  Note 
that the coefficients on i,tBCC  and i,t 1BCC − , and their sum represented by γ , have been 
multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate presentation.   
 We find that the introduction of the business contributions variables has little effect on 
the slope of the reaction function.  The slope coefficients could have been affected indirectly due 
to omitted variables bias stemming from incorrectly excluding BCC.  However, the sα  reported 
in Table 4 are very similar to those in columns 4 to 6 of Table 2, and likewise for the sα  from 
Table 5 in comparison to those from Table 3.   
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 We also find that business campaign contributions do affect tax policy in a direction 
favorable to business.  As shown in Panel B of Tables 4 and 5, the sign of the estimated γ  is 
negative for CIT and CAW, the two tax “rates” that increase business costs, and it is positive for 
ITC, the tax policy that lowers business costs.  This pattern holds for both the RE model and FE 
models.  In the RE model (Table 4), γ  is statistically significant (at conventional levels) for both 
CIT and CAW, but not for ITC.  In the FE model, γ  remains significant for CAW, has a p-value 
slightly above 0.10 for CIT, and remains insignificant for ITC.  
The economic significance of these estimates will be assessed in the following section.  
Here we simply note that the estimated γ  from column 4 of Table 5 implies that a one standard 
deviation (s.d.) movement of BCC is associated with a reduction in CIT of just 0.05 percentage 
points (p.p.), which is 2% of the standard deviation of CIT.  Similar magnitudes are implied by 
the estimated γ  for each of the other two tax variables (from Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5):  A 
one s.d. movement of BCC is associated with an increase in the ITC of 0.09 p.p. (4% of the ITC 
s.d.) and a decrease in the CAW of 0.98 p.p. (8% of the CAW s.d.).  As we show in following 
section, however, even such small movements in tax rates can imply large movements in 
business profits, making business campaign contributions a worthwhile investment.     
 
Extensions 
 This subsection extends our empirical results in four directions.  First, we have thus far 
measured BCC as contributions to candidates for state houses of representatives because house 
elections are held every two years and, relative to senate and gubernatorial elections, a continuity 
exists across time and states in terms of the fraction of house seats up for election each cycle.  
Nonetheless, here we consider whether the results are robust to using a broader measure that 
includes contributions to senate and gubernatorial candidates as well.  This broader measure 
yields similar results.  For instance, the reaction function slopes estimated with the RE model 
and BCC treated as endogenous are -0.303 (p = 0.468), -0.108 (p = 0.918), and -0.760 (p = 
0.135) for CIT, ITC, and CAW, respectively.  These estimates are very similar to the 
corresponding results in Columns 4 to 6 of Table 4.  The estimated γs are also similar, although 
the sign for the ITC regression is now negative (though, as before, the coefficient sum remains 
statistically insignificant).  Specifically, the estimated γs are -0.337 (p = 0.064), -0.372 (p = 
0.657), and -6.013 (p = 0.001) for CIT, ITC, and CAW, respectively.   
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  Second, we explore whether BCC for winning house candidates has differential effects 
on tax policy than BCC for losing house candidates.  We find statistically insignificant 
differences, though this result is driven by the large standard errors on the estimated γwinning and 
γlosing coefficients rather than economically similar point estimates.  This imprecision appears to 
be traceable to the substantial collinearity between BCC for winning and losing candidates.  
 Third, the econometric specifications of tax competition models considered above 
focused on tax variables directly controlled by policymakers.  However, as noted in the Panel 
Dataset section, these legislated tax variables do not provide a comprehensive measure of the 
total tax assessed on capital and may not reflect some nuances in the tax code that affect capital 
taxation.  Table 6 presents results with the average corporate tax rate (ATR) as the tax variable 
for both random and fixed effects specifications and with BCC assumed either exogenous or 
endogenous.   The reaction function slopes continue to be negative, though they are not 
estimated very precisely.  By contrast, the impact of BCC on ATR is greater than on CIT.  
Relative to the comparable coefficient sums in Tables 4 and 5, the γs from Table 6 are larger -- 
they imply that a one s.d. movement of BCC is associated with a reduction in ATR of 7% to 9% 
of the s.d. of ATR -- and they are estimated more precisely.   
 Fourth, a major advantage of panel data is that the econometric model can control for 
state-specific effects that are time invariant.  If these effects are important for tax policy and 
correlated with other factors entering the econometric equation, ignoring their impact, as must be 
done in cross-section regressions, can lead to very different estimates.  To explore the 
importance of state-specific effects, we reestimate our models without controlling for random or 
fixed effects.  The results are radically different.  For example, recall that γCIT is approximately 
−0.390 when either random or fixed effects are included in the specification (when BCC is 
assumed endogenous).  When state effects are removed, γCIT rises dramatically; the estimated 
sum is 0.921 and less precisely estimated.  The positive coefficient implies a perverse result that 
business campaign contributions are associated with higher corporate income tax rates.  
Similarly substantial changes occur for γITC equal to −2.113 (p = 0.136) and γCAW equal to 
−10.185 (p = 0.010).  These results highlight the critical importance of controlling for state 
effects in panel data.  
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 THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
Up to this point, we have not explored the economic value implied by the BCC 
coefficients.  How much does a dollar of business contributions “buy” in terms of reduced taxes?  
We answer this question with respect to an implied change in the corporate income tax rate.  We 
focus here only on CIT because the results reported above suggest that BCC does not have a 
statistically significant effect on ITC and interpreting the corporate tax savings from a change in 
CAW is complicated given it necessarily involves an offsetting increase in the sales or payroll 
factor weights.  Moreover, the CIT is generally considered the most important capital tax policy. 
We begin with the following equation for corporate taxes paid, 
 
[3]   i i i iSCITP CIT *  RAS *$PROFITS ,=  
 
where iSCITP  is state corporate income tax payments in state i, iCIT  is the statutory corporate 
income tax rate that enters our econometric equation, iRAS  is the ratio of the average tax rate to 
the statutory rate, and i$PROFITS  is the dollar value of before-tax corporate profits.  Recall that 
BCCi is the logarithm of per capital business contributions, ( )i i iBCC ln $BCC / POP≡ , where 
i$BCC  is the dollar amount of business campaign contributions and iPOP  is state population.  
The economic value of a business contribution ($BCC) is given by the induced savings in state 
corporate income tax payments ( iΔ ),  
 
[4]   i i i i i i iSCITP / $BCC ( CIT / $BCC )*  RAS *$PROFITS ,Δ ≡ ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂    
 
where we have assumed that the ratio of average to statutory tax rates and before-tax profits are 
unaffected by the change in the statutory corporate tax rate.  The i i( CIT / $BCC )∂ ∂  derivative 
equals γ  divided by i$BCC .  The iRAS  variable is assumed to be the same across states 
( iRAS RAS for all i= ) because it is measured with national data.  Furthermore, we approximate 
i$PROFITS  for a given state as national profits, $PROFITS  , multiplied by the state’s 
population share ( iPOP / POP ).   Lastly, we average over the 48 states to calculate the impact of 
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 business contributions for the representative state to obtain the economic value of business 
contributions, 
 
[5]   
{ }
48 48
i i i
i 1 i 1
i i
/ 48 * POP / $BCC / 48 *  RAS * ($PROFITS / POP)
                       *MEAN POP / $BCC * RAS * ($PROFITS / POP)
= =
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞Δ ≡ Δ = γ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
= γ
∑ ∑
.
 
 
The elements appearing in equations [5] are quantified as follows.  The γ  coefficient is 
taken from column 4 of Table 5 (divided by 1,000, per the notes to Tables 4 and 5).  The 
$PROFITS variable is corporate profits before tax without the inventory valuation and corporate 
capital adjustment for the aggregate economy (U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, Table 1.12) averaged for the period 2004 to 2006 ($1,566,300 million).  (All averages 
in this paragraph are for this period.)7  The average of the POP variable (Bureau of the Census 
website) is 293.43 million.  The RAS variable is a ratio.  The numerator is computed for the 
aggregate economy as state tax receipts on corporate income (U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Survey of Current Business, Table 3.3) divided by the above figure for aggregate corporate 
profits before tax.  The denominator is CIT.  The RAS variable is the average of this ratio and 
equals 0.52.  In 2006, { }i iMEAN POP / $BCC  is 3.68.   
Based on these numbers and the formula above, business campaign contributions appear 
to have considerable economic value.  A $1 campaign contribution yields $3.83 in state 
corporate tax savings.  The result is very similar – $4.03 – if one instead uses the RE estimate of 
γ  (from column 4 of Table 4).  
These figures beg the question, if the value of $1 of business campaign contributions is 
greater than $1, why do businesses not contribute more, raising contributions until the point at 
which the excess return is eliminated?8  There are two possible explanations, which are not 
                                                 
7 We focus on this three year average, rather than the mean for the full sample, because of the secular decline in state 
corporate income tax payments (Wilson, 2006).   
 
8 Our results contribute to the lively debate concerning whether campaign contributions are an investment by firms 
for political influence or consumption by participants in the political process.  See the survey by Ansolabehere, de 
Figueiredo, and Snyder (2003) and the evidence that they present in favor of the consumption view. Recent results 
by Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2009) favor the investment view; they find a large positive impact of  
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 mutually-exclusive, to this “Tullock Puzzle” (1972).  First, while we have interpreted this 
estimated economic value as the benefit resulting from a marginal contribution of a 
representative business, it may reflect behavior conditional on other businesses also contributing.  
No mechanism exists, however, for ensuring these mutual gains are realized (much like in the 
classic “Tragedy of the Commons” problem).9   We have been treating the business sector as a 
single profit-maximizing agent, but a richer model would recognize that it is comprised of 
numerous individual businesses that fail to coordinate in a mutually beneficial way.  The excess 
return to business contributions may reflect coordination failure among businesses.  Second, 
campaign contribution limits may effectively constrain businesses from increasing campaign 
contributions to the point where their value equals their cost.        
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS   
 This paper has explored the role played by business campaign contributions in 
determining state tax policy in a world of mobile capital.  We expand the standard model of tax 
competition to allow for the influence of business contributions on the corporate income tax rate, 
the investment tax credit rate, the capital apportionment weight, and the average corporate tax 
rate.  Our empirical model explains each of these tax policies as functions of tax policies in 
competitive states (reflecting the usual role of tax competition) and business contributions, as 
well as control variables for the economic and political environment, state effects, and time fixed 
effects.    
 Based on a panel of U.S. states and unique data on business campaign contributions, our 
empirical work uncovers four key results.  First, we document a significant direct effect of 
business contributions on tax policy.  Second, the economic value of a $1 business campaign 
contribution in terms of lower state corporate taxes is nearly $4.  Third, the slope of the reaction 
function between tax policy in a given state and the tax policies of its competitive states is 
negative.  Fourth, we highlight the sensitivity of the empirical results to state effects.    
                                                                                                                                                             
business contributions to federal elections on returns.  By contrast, Aggarwal, Meschke, and Wang (2008) find that 
business contributions to federal elections are negatively related to future returns because of a link between 
contributions and corporate governance problems.   
 
9 Hardin (1968) and Olson (1965) discuss the difficulties faced by groups in achieving their common interests, 
though Ostrom (1990) takes a more sanguine view based on the evolution of institutions.   
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  These provocative results call for further research aimed at understanding the 
determinants of business campaign contributions and the “Tullock Puzzle,” the persistence of 
such large gaps between benefits and costs.  What constraints prevent businesses from making 
additional contributions and exploiting these huge benefits?  Are campaign contribution limits 
effective in constraining business campaign contributions?  We intend to examine these and 
related issues in future research.
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 APPENDIX:  DOCUMENTATION FOR DATA ON BUSINESS CAMPAIGN 
                            CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTION LIMITS  
Business Campaign Contributions  
With financial support from the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, we purchased 
data on state campaign contributions from the National Institute of Money in State Politics 
(NIMSP).  The NIMSP collects data on contributions from individuals and organizations to 
individual candidates for state government office.  The following statement is from the NIMSP 
website (www.followthemoney.org) and describes the sources of their data: 
 
The Institute receives its data in either electronic or paper files from the state disclosure 
agencies with which candidates must file their campaign finance reports. The Institute 
collects the information for all state-level candidates in the primary and general elections 
and then puts it into a database. 
 
Staff members verify that all candidates are represented and that their political party 
affiliations and win/loss statuses are correct. Researchers then standardize the contributor 
names and assign political donors an economic interest code, based either on the 
occupation and employer information contained in the disclosure reports or on 
information found through a variety of research resources. These codes are closely 
modeled on designations used by the federal government for classifying industry groups. 
 
While identifying and coding major labor and industry contributions is relatively 
straightforward, doing so for individual contributors can be more difficult. In many cases, 
the state requires that contributors provide the campaigns with their occupation and/or 
employer. When that information is available, the Institute uses it to assign a category 
code for individual contributors. When that information is not required or candidates do 
not provide it, the staff uses standard research tools to determine an economic or political 
identity. Phone directories provided on CD or through the Internet often include a 
Standard Industrial Classification for an individual contributor, particularly those who 
own their own business or are in an easily identifiable profession such as attorney, doctor, 
insurance salesman, or real estate agent. Professional directories provide additional 
information, as does Polk's Reverse Directories. 
 
Contributors for whom researchers cannot determine an economic interest from the 
information available receive a code indicating their interest is Unknown. 
 
 
The NIMSP provided us with the “Summary File” for each state and invaluable 
explanations of details about their data.  A state’s Summary File contains dollar values of 
contributions to individual candidates, by year, aggregated across all contributors within a 
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 “sector.”  These sectors include industries as well as labor organizations, “ideologies,” political 
parties, etc..  We define the “business” supersector as the sum of the following 9 sectors:  
agriculture; construction; communications and electronics; defense; energy and natural 
resources; finance, insurance, and real estate; general business; transportation; and health.10 
We first aggregate contributions across these 9 sectors to obtain business contributions by 
candidate, year, and state.  Similarly, we aggregate contributions over the remaining sectors to 
obtain nonbusiness contributions. 
The Summary Files also provide detailed information on the candidate receiving the 
donations – in particular, their “office” (e.g., governor, lieutenant governor, house or assembly, 
senate, supreme court, attorney general, comptroller, treasurer, public utility commission, 
secretary of state, etc.) and “status.”  Status indicates the outcome of the candidate’s candidacy 
as of the end of the year.  Candidacies in the data can have one of the following 9 statuses:  
general election (GE) win, GE loss, primary election loss, withdrawal, disqualification, death, 
unknown, still pending (as of end of year), and “did not run” (meaning the candidate received 
contributions in that year but was not running for office that year). 
We then aggregate business contributions across candidates, by year and state, for each 
status and for four categories of “office”:  gubernatorial (includes both governor and lieutenant 
governor because in some states these candidates are listed on a joint ticket and so it is not 
possible for NIMSP to separate contributions between the governor candidate and lieutenant 
governor candidate), house (variously called by states, “house of assembly”, “house of 
delegates”, and “house of representatives”), senate, and other statewide office.  In Nebraska, 
which has a unicameral state legislature, legislative candidates’ offices are coded as “senate.” 
The resulting panel data set has state-year observations on 36 business campaign 
contributions (BCC) variables:  BCC to candidates for each of the 4 offices above and for each 
of the 9 statuses above. 
From these 36 BCC variables, we construct the following variables for possible use in 
our analysis: 
                                                 
10 The above description by the NIMSP of their extensive efforts to assign contributions from individuals to a 
particular economic sector, may lead one to think that contributions from individuals, as opposed to organizations, is 
the bulk of business contributions.  They are not.  According to the breakdown of contributions by individuals vs. 
organizations provided on the NIMSP website, individuals make up around a third to a half of business contributions 
(depending on the state and year). 
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 Explanatory Variables 
HBCC      – business contributions-house 
SBCC      – business contributions-senate 
GBCC      – business contributions-governor/lieutenant governor 
HSGBCC    – business contributions-house + senate + governor  
 
Candidate Instrumental Variables 
WNBC  – non-business contributions-house-GE winners 
LNBC  – non-business contributions-house-GE losers 
NBC  – non-business contributions-house-GE winners + GE losers  
 
The sample period covered by this data set is 1990-2006, though there are fewer states 
with data prior to the 1997-98 electoral cycle.  The following table shows the number of states in 
each two-year electoral cycle with reported business contributions: 
 
Number of States with Reported Business Contributions in NIMSP Data 
Electoral Cycle: Number of States 
1989 – 1990 12 
1991 – 1992 12 
1993 – 1994 19 
1995 – 1996 33 
1997 – 1998 41 
1999 – 2000 47 
2001 – 2002 48 
2003 – 2004 48 
2005 – 2006 48 
 
As indicated by the table above, contributions data in the NIMSP data set are not reported for all 
states in all years.   
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 States can be categorized into four groups to describe their data availability: 
 
1. Most (40 of 48) states have only even-year data on business contributions.  These states 
have biennial electoral cycles that end in even-years and report contributions over the 
entire two-year period in that single even-year. 
 
2. Two states – New Jersey and Virginia – have only odd-year contributions data; they have 
biennial electoral cycles ending in odd-years and report contributions over the entire two-
year period in that single odd-year. 
 
3. Five states – Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin – have 
biennial, even-year elections but report contributions that take place in either election 
years or non-election (odd) years.  For these states, off-election-year contributions 
generally are for statewide offices other than governor, house, or senate (so governor, 
house, or senate contributions generally are just for even years, like the 40 states in the 
first group above). 
 
4. California has a biennial, even-year cycle like group 1 above but has contributions 
reported for 2003 in connection with the special gubernatorial recall election in that year. 
 
Since most states only report contributions at a two-year, electoral-cycle frequency, it is not 
known how contributions are divided among the two years within a cycle.  If non-election-year 
contributions are generally close to zero, then the appropriate way to handle the data is to assign 
all of the contributions for the cycle to the election year and assume unreported contributions are 
0 in non-election years.  In this case, the data set constructed at an annual frequency is 
appropriate for the purposes of our regression analysis.   
 
Campaign Contributions Limits 
There are at least six different kinds of campaign contribution limits (CCLs):  (1) on 
corporate contributions, (2) on individual contributions, (3) on candidates’ own and family 
contributions, (4) on political action committee (PAC) contributions, (5) on labor union 
contributions, and (6) on contributions by political parties. 
The basic principle we use for constructing a uniform panel of data for these six types of 
CCLs is as follows:  “What is the maximum amount that a contributor (individual, corporation, 
candidate, PAC, union, or party) could make to a single candidate in this state in this electoral 
cycle?”  There are two main categories of CCLs:  CCLs that set a maximum contribution limit 
from a single contributor to a specific candidate (the easiest case to record in our dataset), and 
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 CCLs that cap aggregate contributions from a single contributor to all candidates seeking a 
particular office, such as governor or state senate.  In the latter case, we assume that the 
contributor would use their entire allowable donation (if binding) for one candidate, to maximize 
impact.  Contribution maximums in the dataset specify the most a contributor can contribute in a 
particular election cycle, which includes both the primary and general elections.  In states where 
the limit applies on a calendar-year basis, we multiply it by 2 to be (roughly) equivalent to a 
primary/general cycle.    
Nebraska is a special case, where candidates are limited in the total amount they can 
receive in corporate donations.  The assumption used to enter this information in our dataset is 
that one donor can give an amount equal to this maximum (e.g., $825,000 for governor). 
There have been a number of court cases on whether particular campaign finance limits 
are unconstitutional, which is a primarily reason for the large amount of within-state variation in 
CCLs over time.  Some states (e.g., Colorado) abandoned all limits for 2 years, then rolled out 
new ones that presumably passed Constitutional muster.  This is one reason to think CCLs are 
exogenous with respect to a state’s tax policy. 
In a handful of states, the maximum contribution limit is higher if the candidate agrees to 
spending limits (New Hampshire) or is qualified to receive public funding (Rhode Island).  In 
these cases, we assume that these higher limits apply. 
Our data sources for CCLs are as follows: 
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Electoral Cycle: Source 
1995 – 1996 The Book of the States (The Council of State Governments :  
Lexington, Kentucky, Various Issues).  
1997 – 1998 Federal Election Commission: 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl98/cflaw98.html 
1999 – 2000 Federal Election Commission: 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl00/cfl00.htm 
2001 – 2002 Federal Election Commission: 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/cfl/cfl02/cfl02.shtml 
2003 – 2004 
2005 – 2006 
National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), historical tables 
“Individual to Candidate Contributions,” “Corporate to Candidate 
Contributions” from  
archived versions of the NCSL website:   
http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.ncsl.org.  For example, 2004 limits 
are found at the 2005 NCSL web page: http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20051113033231/www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/CorpCand.htm 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 
SAMPLE PERIOD:  1990-2006 
    Quartiles 
  
 
Mean SD 
 
25% 50% 75% 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
A. Business Contributions       
BCCHi,t 0.234 0.345  0.000 0.000 0.408 
BCCSi,t 0.160 0.260  0.000 0.000 0.268 
BCCGi,t 0.256 0.560  0.000 0.000 0.208 
BCCHSGi,t 0.651 1.012  0.000 0.000 1.053 
       
B. Tax Variables       
CITi,t 0.064 0.028  0.050 0.070 0.085 
CIT#i,t 0.067 0.007  0.063 0.066 0.071 
ITCi,t 0.013 0.024  0.000 0.000 0.020 
ITC#i,t 0.015 0.005  0.012 0.014 0.018 
CAWi,t 0.207 0.120  0.125 0.250 0.250 
CAW#i,t 0.210 0.024  0.191 0.209 0.227 
ATRi,t 0.014 0.010  0.008 0.011 0.017 
ATR#i,t 0.009 0.001  0.008 0.009 0.010 
       
C. Control Variables       
IKi,t-1 0.110 0.029  0.090 0.107 0.124 
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 0.468 0.370  0.000 0.500 0.500 
IK#i,t-1 0.109 0.014  0.096 0.109 0.121 
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 Notes to Table 1: 
There are 522 observations for each variable.  In panel A, the business campaign contributions 
variables ( xi,tBCC ) are defined as the logarithm of business campaign contributions per capita 
and are contributions to candidates for the house (H), senate (S), governorship (G), and all three 
offices combined (HSG).  In panel B, the tax variables are the corporate income tax rate ( i,tCIT ), 
the investment tax credit rate ( i,tITC ), the capital apportionment weight ( i,tCAW ), and the 
average corporate tax rate ( i,tATR ).  The tax variables with a superscript 
# are tax variables in 
the competitive states, where the competitive set of states is the other 47 contiguous states.  (The 
superscript # can be interpreted as a spatial lag operator.)  The #i,tCIT  variable, for example, is 
defined as a weighted-average of the corporate income tax rates for each of these 47 competitive 
states, and the weights are the inverse of the distance between the population centroids for state i 
and that of a competitive state, normalized to sum to unity.  The #i,tITC , 
#
i,tCAW  , and 
#
i,tATR  
variables are computed in a similar manner.  In panel C, the control variables are the 
investment/capital ratio ( i,t 1IK − ) lagged one period capturing economic conditions, the political 
preferences of state residents ( i,t 1VOTERPREFERENCES − ) defined as 0.0, 0.5, or 1.0 
depending on the extent to which Republicans control the state government, and #i,t 1IK − .  See the 
section The Panel Dataset and the Appendix for further details about data sources and 
construction.   
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TABLE 2 
TAX COMPETITION -- BASELINE MODEL, STATE RANDOM EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: τi,t 
OLS AND GMM ESTIMATES 
 
 τ#i,t Exogenous τ#i,t Endogenous 
 CIT ITC CAW CIT ITC CAW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Neighboring States Tax Variable       
τ#i,t -1.624 -0.817 -1.308 -0.730 0.093 1.503 
 {0.019} {0.123} {0.022} {0.651} {0.982} {0.454}
τ#i,t-1 0.778 0.278 0.391 -0.082 -0.520 -1.742 
 {0.389} {0.688} {0.589} {0.959} {0.882} {0.286}
τ #i,t-2 0.593 0.063 -0.359 0.597 0.145 -0.469 
 {0.362} {0.904} {0.526} {0.359} {0.801} {0.424}
-0.253 -0.477 -1.276 -0.214 -0.282 -0.708 α = Sum of Coefficients on the τ#i,t s 
{0.443} {0.372} {0.000} {0.592} {0.755} {0.162}
       
B. Control Variables       
IKi,t-1 0.008 0.019 -0.040 0.008 0.016 -0.019 
 {0.305} {0.322} {0.566} {0.286} {0.533} {0.798}
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 0.001 -0.004 0.010 0.001 -0.004 0.007 
 {0.427} {0.029} {0.147} {0.420} {0.032} {0.294}
IK#i,t-1 -0.111 0.215 -0.694 -0.115 0.171 -0.228 
 {0.074} {0.172} {0.227} {0.064} {0.599} {0.736}
       
C. Equation Fit and Instrument Quality       
R2 0.114 0.054 0.315 ----- ----- ----- 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
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TABLE 3 
TAX COMPETITION -- BASELINE MODEL, STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: τi,t 
OLS AND GMM ESTIMATES 
 
 τ#i,t Exogenous τ#i,t Endogenous 
 CIT ITC CAW CIT ITC CAW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Neighboring States Tax Variable       
τ#i,t -2.657 -0.863 -1.262 -1.864 0.919 2.218 
 {0.014} {0.180} {0.116} {0.356} {0.767} {0.087}
τ#i,t-1 0.871 0.284 0.392 0.296 -1.217 -2.148 
 {0.358} {0.463} {0.390} {0.895} {0.671} {0.054}
τ#i,t-2 -0.116 0.107 -0.438 0.156 0.280 -0.613 
 {0.870} {0.598} {0.326} {0.875} {0.490} {0.144}
-1.902 -0.473 -1.307 -1.411 -0.017 -0.543 α = Sum of Coefficients on the τ#i,t s 
{0.184} {0.491} {0.060} {0.088} {0.977} {0.134}
       
B. Control Variables       
IKi,t-1 0.006 0.021 -0.031 0.006 0.012 0.006 
 {0.527} {0.251} {0.754} {0.342} {0.413} {0.941}
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 0.001 -0.003 0.010 0.001 -0.003 0.013 
 {0.436} {0.185} {0.512} {0.170} {0.011} {0.088}
IK#i,t-1 -0.100 0.270 -0.496 -0.106 0.119 0.169 
 {0.252} {0.342} {0.374} {0.052} {0.620} {0.701}
       
C. Equation Fit and Instrument Quality       
p-Value for the J Statistic ----- ----- ----- 0.696 0.411 0.131 
Eigenvalue Statistic for τ#i,t ----- ----- ----- 20.911 4.980 10.894 
       
R2 0.138 0.055 0.316 ----- ----- ----- 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
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 Notes To Tables 2 and 3: 
OLS (columns 1 to 3) and GMM (columns 4 to 6) estimates are based on equation [2] with panel 
data for 48 states for the period 1990 to 2006.  Missing observations for the business campaign 
contributions data and outliers reduce the sample to 522 state/year observations.  Columns 1, 2, 
and 3 treat #i,tτ  as an exogenous variable; columns 4, 5, and 6 treat 
#
i,tτ  as an endogenous 
variable.  The dependent variable ( i,tτ ) is the tax variable appearing at the top of the column.  
See the Notes To Table 1 for details about the table entries.  All models contain state effects 
(either random or fixed) and time fixed effects.  The α  parameter measures the long-run impact 
of a change in #i,tτ  and is defined in equation [2] as the sum of the coefficients on the 
#
i,tτ s; the 
standard error for α  is the sum of the underlying variances and covariances raised to the one-half 
power.  Standard errors are heteroscedastic consistent based on the technique in White (1980); 
they are not presented in the table.  Rather, the p-values for the t-test that the immediately 
preceding coefficient is zero are presented in braces.  The J statistic assesses instrument validity 
via the overidentifying restrictions and is computed according to the formula in Hansen (1982).  
The p-values for the J statistic are presented in the table.  A p-value greater than an arbitrary 
critical value (e.g., 10%) implies that the instruments are valid.  The eigenvalue statistic assesses 
instrument relevance for #i,tτ  in terms of a first-stage regression of an endogenous variable on the 
instruments, as proposed by Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002).  The null hypothesis of instrument 
irrelevance at a significance level of 5% is assessed with Table 1 of Stock and Yogo (2005).  For 
the results estimated in Tables 2 and 3, an eigenvalue statistic greater than 10.9 or 18.4 rejects 
the null hypothesis constructed with a bias of 10% or 5%, respectively.  The instruments for #i,tτ  
differ for each of the three tax variables.  For i,tCIT , the instruments consist of the first-order 
and second-order spatial lags of a dummy variable indicating the reelection of a Republican (R) 
governor in the prior year and the first-order and second-order spatial lags of an interaction 
between a R governor dummy and a Democratic/Independent (DI) party controlled legislature 
dummy.  For i,tITC , the instruments consist of the first-order spatial lags of the R governor 
dummy and the interaction mentioned in the previous sentence.  For i,tCAW , the instruments are 
the first-order and second-order spatial lags of a dummy indicating the reelection of an 
incumbent governor in the prior year and the first-order and second-order spatial lags of a 
dummy indicating a change in governorship party last year from R to DI.  The selection of the 
instrument set is described in the section on The Panel Dataset/Political Variables; the three sets 
of instruments discussed above correspond to items (g) and (i), (a) and (g), and (d) and (h), 
respectively, listed in that sub-section.  The R2 statistic measures the fraction of total variation 
measured by the model, including that explained by state and year fixed effects.   
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TABLE 4 
ROLE OF BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, STATE RANDOM EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: τi,t 
GMM ESTIMATES 
 BCCi,t Exogenous BCCi,t Endogenous 
 CIT ITC CAW CIT ITC CAW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Neighboring States Tax Variable       
τ#i,t -0.587 0.965 0.929 -0.554 0.946 0.938 
 {0.719} {0.787} {0.640} {0.731} {0.792} {0.636} 
τ#i,t-1 -0.140 -1.405 -1.518 -0.177 -1.388 -1.523 
 {0.931} {0.641} {0.344} {0.912} {0.645} {0.342} 
τ#i,t-2 0.506 0.272 -0.340 0.495 0.269 -0.342 
 {0.440} {0.626} {0.553} {0.449} {0.629} {0.551} 
-0.221 -0.168 -0.930 -0.236 -0.173 -0.927 α = Sum of Coefficients on the τ#i,t s 
{0.587} {0.856} {0.067} {0.565} {0.853} {0.068}
B. Business Contributions       
BCCi,t -0.166 0.312 -2.974 -0.204 0.308 -2.926 
 {0.113} {0.379} {0.006} {0.074} {0.460} {0.012} 
BCCi,t-1 -0.166 0.450 -3.772 -0.191 0.447 -3.740 
 {0.097} {0.184} {0.000} {0.068} {0.237} {0.000} 
-0.332 0.762 -6.747 -0.395 0.755 -6.665 γ = Sum of Coefficients on the BCCi,t s 
{0.079} {0.254} {0.000} {0.053} {0.328} {0.001}
C. Control Variables       
IKi,t-1 0.009 0.011 -0.002 0.009 0.011 -0.002 
 {0.225} {0.643} {0.982} {0.215} {0.640} {0.981} 
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 0.001 -0.003 0.007 0.001 -0.003 0.007 
 {0.452} {0.047} {0.312} {0.452} {0.047} {0.312} 
IK#i,t-1 -0.098 0.098 0.023 -0.095 0.099 0.021 
 {0.115} {0.743} {0.972} {0.129} {0.737} {0.974} 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
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TABLE 5 
ROLE OF BUSINESS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS, STATE FIXED EFFECTS 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: τi,t 
GMM ESTIMATES 
       
 BCCi,t Exogenous BCCi,t Endogenous 
 CIT ITC CAW CIT ITC CAW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
A. Neighboring States Tax Variable       
τ#i,t -1.474 1.298 1.873 -1.431 1.330 1.866 
 {0.484} {0.670} {0.141} {0.492} {0.660} {0.143} 
τ#i,t-1 -0.037 -1.682 -2.089 -0.073 -1.707 -2.081 
 {0.987} {0.536} {0.057} {0.974} {0.526} {0.058} 
τ#i,t-2 0.157 0.348 -0.512 0.155 0.350 -0.512 
 {0.869} {0.375} {0.212} {0.871} {0.370} {0.213} 
-1.354 -0.035 -0.728 -1.350 -0.027 -0.727 α = Sum of Coefficients on the τ#i,t s 
{0.104} {0.956} {0.043} {0.106} {0.968} {0.043}
       
B. Business Contributions       
BCCi,t -0.169 0.274 -2.957 -0.196 0.256 -2.992 
 {0.144} {0.405} {0.004} {0.122} {0.524} {0.009} 
BCCi,t-1 -0.159 0.398 -3.630 -0.178 0.384 -3.660 
 {0.164} {0.283} {0.002} {0.151} {0.364} {0.003} 
-0.328 0.672 -6.587 -0.375 0.640 -6.652 γ = Sum of Coefficients on the BCCi,t s 
{0.146} {0.331} {0.001} {0.130} {0.435} {0.002}
       
C. Control Variables       
IKi,t-1 0.007 0.009 0.032 0.007 0.009 0.031 
 {0.260} {0.514} {0.662} {0.250} {0.509} {0.664} 
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 0.001 -0.003 0.011 0.001 -0.003 0.011 
 {0.212} {0.017} {0.143} {0.215} {0.017} {0.145} 
IK#i,t-1 -0.090 0.069 0.443 -0.087 0.069 0.449 
 {0.107} {0.753} {0.316} {0.127} {0.751} {0.314} 
36
 D. Instrument Quality       
p-Value for the J Statistic 0.791 0.342 0.172 0.798 0.343 0.172 
Eigenvalue Statistic  20.304 5.285 10.670 16.585 3.543 8.546 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 522 522 522 522 522 522 
 
 
Notes To Table 4 and 5:    
GMM estimates are based on equation [2].  Columns 1, 2, and 3 treat i,tBCC  as an exogenous 
variable; columns 4, 5, and 6 treat i,tBCC  as an endogenous variable.  (The 
#
i,tτ  variable is 
treated as endogenous in all models reported in Tables 4 and 5.)  The i,tBCC  variable is the 
logarithm of business campaign contributions made to candidates for the state house (assembly) 
per capita.  See the Notes to Tables 1 and 2-3 for details about the table entries.  The instrument 
for i,tBCC  is the number of candidates that ran for a state house seat.  The selection of the 
instrument set is described in the section on The Panel Dataset/Business Campaign Contributions 
Variables; the instrument discussed above corresponds to item (b) listed in that sub-section.  The 
coefficients for i,tBCC , i,t 1BCC − , and γ  are multiplied by 1,000 to facilitate presentation.  For 
the models reported in Tables 4 and 5, an eigenvalue statistic greater than 8.8 or 14.0 rejects the 
null hypothesis of instrument irrelevance constructed with a bias of 10% or 5%, respectively.   
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TABLE 6 
ALTERNATIVE TAX MEASURE:  AVERAGE CORPORATE TAX RATE 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: τi,t 
GMM ESTIMATES 
     
 BCCi,t Exogenous BCCi,t Endogenous 
 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
Random 
Effects 
Fixed 
Effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Neighboring States Tax Variable     
τ#i,t 1.337 1.089 1.341 1.093 
 {0.230} {0.229} {0.229} {0.228} 
τ#i,t-1 -1.569 -1.213 -1.566 -1.219 
 {0.041} {0.038} {0.041} {0.037} 
τ#i,t-2 -0.646 -0.384 -0.652 -0.403 
 {0.152} {0.271} {0.148} {0.248} 
-0.878 -0.509 -0.878 -0.528 α = Sum of Coefficients on the τ#i,t s 
{0.185} {0.395} {0.186} {0.379} 
     
B. Business Contributions     
BCCi,t -0.202 -0.194 -0.250 -0.253 
 {0.079} {0.060} {0.047} {0.040} 
BCCi,t-1 -0.290 -0.287 -0.323 -0.327 
 {0.007} {0.004} {0.004} {0.004} 
-0.492 -0.481 -0.572 -0.580 γ = Sum of Coefficients on the BCCi,t s 
{0.016} {0.013} {0.010} {0.011} 
     
C. Control Variables     
IKi,t-1 0.030 0.029 0.030 0.029 
 {0.000} {0.155} {0.000} {0.149} 
VOTERPREFERENCESi,t-1 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 {0.133} {0.156} {0.130} {0.151} 
IK#i,t-1 -0.036 -0.030 0.032 0.024 
38
  {0.572} {0.587} {0.622} {0.665} 
D. Instrument Quality     
p-Value for the J Statistic - 0.843 - 0.775 
Eigenvalue Statistic - 17.720 - 0.482 
 
     
Number of Observations 522 522 522 522 
 
 
 
Notes To Table 6: 
GMM estimates are based on equation [2].  Columns 1 and 2 treat i,tBCC  as an exogenous 
variable; columns 3 and 4 treat i,tBCC  as an endogenous variable.  (The 
#
i,tτ  variable is treated 
as endogenous in all models reported in Table 6.)  See the Notes to Tables 1, 2-3, and 4-5 for 
details about the table entries.  The coefficients for i,tBCC , i,t 1BCC − , and γ  are multiplied by 
1,000 to facilitate presentation.    
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